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-ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Department of Water Resources ("Department") submits this reply brief in 
response to the statements and arguments in respondent Idaho Power Company's ("Idaho Power" 
or "Company") brief: 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF IDAHO CODE § 42-203B AUTHORIZES 
THE STATE TO INCLUDE TERM CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF 
LICENSING. 
The question before this Court is whether I.C. § 42-203B authorizes the Department to 
add a term condition to a hydropower water right at the time of licensing. Respondent Idaho 
Power's argument that I.e. § 42-203B(7) prevents the Department from adding a term condition 
to a hydropower water right at licensing is contrary to the plain language of both I.e. §§ 42-
203B(6) and 42-203B(7). 
I.C. § 42-203B(6) provides: 
The director shall have the authority to subordinate the rights granted in a permit 
or license for power purposes to subsequent upstream beneficial depletionary 
uses .... The director shall also have the authority to limit a permit or license for 
power purposes to a specific term. 
I.e. § 42-203B(6) (emphasis added). 
The use of the disjunctive "or" is a clear indication that the Director of the 
Department has the authority to limit a hydropower water right to a specific term at 
licensing. Idaho Power cites to the third-to-Iast sentence of I.e. § 42-203B(7) and argues 
this restricts the Director's authority. Response Brief at 11-15. However, Idaho Power 
fails to even acknowledge the first sentence of subsection (7), which mimics subsection 
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(6) and provides in no uncertain terms that the Director, in the exercise of his authority, 
can include term conditions at the time of licensing: 
The director in the exercise of the authority to limit a permit or license for power 
purposes to a specific term of years shall designate the number of years through 
which the term of the license shall extend and for purposes of determining such 
date shall consider among other factors: '" . 
I.e. § 42-203B(7) (emphasis added). 
The third-to-Iast sentence of subsection (7) provides, "The term of years shall be 
determined at the time of issuance of the permit, or as soon thereafter as practicable if adequate 
information is not then available." Idaho Power argues this sentence means the Director can 
only insert term conditions at the permit stage. Response Brief at 8. This clearly conflicts with 
the plain language of subsection (6) and the first sentence of subsection (7). Interpretations of 
statutes that lead to conflicting results are disfavored. In construing statutes, "it is the Court's 
obligation, where possible, to adopt a construction that will harmonize and reconcile statutory 
provisions and to avoid an interpretation that will render a statute a nullity." State v. Horejs, 143 
Idaho 260, 266, 141 P.3d 1129, 1135 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). 
Idaho Power also argues the third-to-Iast sentence of subsection (7) was added to restrict 
the Director's authority to add a term condition at licensing. Response Brief at 13. This is Idaho 
Power's attempt to create ambiguity in the statute where none exists. This sentence addresses 
the issuance of future permits, not permits existing at the time the statute was passed. The 
forwarding looking application of this sentence is evidenced by the fact it is worded in the future 
tense. The third-to-Iast sentence of subsection (7) provides the term of years "shall be 
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determined at the time of issuance of the permit or as soon thereafter as practicable if adequate 
information is not then available." (Emphasis added). The use of the future tense "shall be" 
indicates that the intended application was to permits that were to be issued after the statute was 
in effect. The statement "if not then available" allows a term condition to be established later if 
there is not sufficient information to set the term when the new permit is issued. The sentence is 
forward looking, applying to future permits and does not prevent the Department from inserting 
term conditions at the time of licensing. I 
B. IT IS THE EXPRESSLY STATED LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT THE 
DIRECTOR BE AUTHORIZED TO INCLUDE TERM CONDITIONS AT 
THE TIME OF LICENSING. 
Idaho Power asks this Court to shy away from a "deep and searching" review of the 
legislative history. Response Briefat 12. They do this because they know the legislative history 
shows it was the stated intent that the State of Idaho be able to include term conditions at the 
time of licensing. 
1. Legislative Intent of Idaho Code § 42-203B(6). 
The legislative history of I.e. § 42-203B is inextricably intertwined with the Swan Falls 
settlement. As a term of the Swan Falls Agreement, Idaho Power agreed to propose and support 
Idaho Power also argues that the State cannot exercise its authority in this case because adding a term 
condition at the time of licensing of the water right violates the "as soon thereafter as practicable" provision of 
subsection (7). Response Brief at 12. Since subsection (6) and the first sentence of subsection (7) provide that a 
term condition can be added at the time of license, this shows the Legislature must have considered the time of 
licensing as a "practicable" time to add the term conditions. Moreover, as is discussed in Subsection (B) of this 
brief below, it was the stated intent of the legislation to authorize the State to go back and add term conditions at the 
time of licensing. As such, the time of licensing must be an acceptable time to add term conditions to hydropower 
water rights. 
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(jointly with the State) the enactment of I.e. § 42-203B? This was affirmed by the SRBA 
district court: "[The Agreement] also provided that the parties would propose and support 
legislation consistent with the provisions of the Framework, including what became I.e. § 42-
203B.,,3 The SRBA court recognized that Idaho Power helped draft the proposed hydropower 
legislation that was enacted as I.e. § 42-203B,4 and that the proposed legislation "clearly and 
unambiguously reflects the intent of the parties."s Thus, as the SRBA court determined, "the 
Swan Falls Agreement ... incorporates the provisions of I.e. § 42-203B.,,6 The SRBA court 
also affirmed that "As a term and condition of the Agreement, Idaho Power agreed to the 
regulatory authority of the State as is now codified at I.e. § 42-203B.,,7 In short, as the SRBA 
court observed, "the Swan Falls Agreement was not a self-executing instrument, but rather 
2 Swan Falls Agreement lj[lj[ 4, 13, 17, Exhibits 7 A & 7B, attached as Addendum A to the Department's 
opening brief. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, In re SRBA, Consolidated 
Subcase No. 00-92023 (92-23), at 9 (Apr. IS, 200S) ("SRBA Memorandum Decision"), attached as Addendum B to 
the Department's opening brief. See also id. at 11 ("Specifically, paragraph 13(A)(vii) of the Agreement refers to 
and provides for enactment of subordination legislation 'as set forth in Exhibits 7 A and 7B attached to this 
agreement.' Exhibit [sic) 7 A and 7B were attached to the Agreement and were to be enacted as I.e. § 42-203B."); 
id. at 22 ("Senate Bill 1008, later codified as Idaho Code § 42-203B, was proposed and introduced into the 
legislature pursuant to and in accordance with the Swan Falls Agreement. The Swan Falls Agreement was 
specifically conditioned on the enactment of Senate Bill 100S."); id. at 26 (referring to "the agreement between the 
parties to enact I.e. § 42-203B."). See also 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws 25-26 (enacting Idaho Code § 42-203B under 
Senate Bill 1008). 
4 SRBA Memorandum Decision at 38. SRBA Consolidated Subcase No. 00-92023 was dismissed in March 
of this year, and the SRBA Memorandum Decision is a final decision and order. Idaho Power did not appeal the 
decision. 
S SRBA Memorandum Decision at 32. 
6 SRBA Memorandum Decision at 22 (emphasis added). 
7 SRBA Memorandum Decision at 1. See also id. at 31 ("Idaho Power was simply conceding to and agreeing 
not challenge the State's regulatory authority"); id. at 45 ("Idaho Power simply agreed to the State's regulatory 
authority as applied to its rights"); id. at 46 ("as a term of the contract, Idaho Power agreed to the State's regulatory 
authority."). As required for the Swan Falls Agreement to become effective and binding, in 1985 the Legislature 
enacted the hydropower subordination legislation of I.e. § 42-203B. See 19S5 Idaho Sess. Laws 25-26. 
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proposed a suite of legislative and administrative action that if implemented would resolve the 
controversy and the legal issues to the mutual satisfaction of the parties."s Idaho Code § 42-
203B was the acknowledged centerpiece of the legislation contemplated by the Agreement. 
In explaining this important piece of legislation to the Senate Resources Committee, it 
was Idaho Power's own attorney and Swan Falls negotiator Tom Nelson who stated the express 
intent of I.C § 42-203B(6) was to allow the State of Idaho to add new conditions in exiting 
permits at the time of licensing. At the legislative hearing, Senator William Ringert first raised 
the question of whether I.C § 42-203B(6) would allow the Director to add new conditions to 
existing permits when they were licensed.9 He observed that because the proposed legislation 
authorized the Director to subordinate a hydropower "permit or license", the Director would 
have the authority to insert at licensing a new condition that had not been present in the permit. iO 
Tom Nelson responded that the statute had been so drafted because the State "wanted the power 
to go back and subordinate those [unsubordinated hydropower] permits at the time that they issue 
the license." I I Thus, Idaho Power's own representative knew and expressly stated the intent of 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 26. 
9 Transcript of Senate Resources and Environment Committee Meeting (Feb. l, 1985), at pp. 33-34, attached 
as Addendum F to the Department's opening brief. 
IO Id. 
II Id. at 34 (emphasis added). While Senator Ringert's comments and Nelson's response address the 
inclusion of subordination provisions instead of the inclusion of term conditions, the same plain reading of the 
statute by Senator Ringert for subordination provisions is also is applicable to term conditions. I.e. § 42-203B(6) 
provides that both conditions may be added to a "permit or license." Given the mirror language, the State 
undoubtedly wanted the power to go back and include term conditions in permits at the time the Department issues 
the license as well. 
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I.e. § 42-203B(6) was to allow the Director to add new conditions to existing hydropower 
permits when the Director issues the license. 
Idaho Power now seeks to avoid discussing the legislative history of I.C. § 42-203B(6), 
and its relationship to the Swan Falls Agreement, because the SRBA court has already rejected 
the same arguments Idaho Power has raised in opposition to the statute in this case. As 
demonstrated by the SRBA court's decision, in the SRBA proceedings Idaho Power attempted to 
distance itself from I.e. § 42-203B, challenged the statute as ambiguous and unconstitutional, 
and resisted application of I.e. § 42-203B to Idaho Power's hydropower water rights. The 
SRBA court reviewed the Agreement and the statute in detail, including the legislative history, 
and firmly rejected Idaho Power's arguments and positions. 
The SRBA court held that the subordination legislation that became I.e. § 42-203B 
"clearly and unambiguously reflects the intent of the parties," and that "this Court finds it 
inconceivable that Idaho Power would enter into a contract with one of the conditions of the 
contract being that the State pass legislation entirely inconsistent with the body of the contract or 
the intent of the parties.,,12 In addressing Idaho Power's contention that it had never understood 
the statute to mean what it clearly says, the SRBA court commented that "Idaho Power perhaps 
lacked an appreciation for the plain meaning of the language which it not only agreed to, but 
helped to draft.,,13 The SRBA court also rejected Idaho Power's arguments that I.e. § 42-203B 
is unconstitutional because the Company had waived any such objections as a term of the 
12 
13 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 32. 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 38. 
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Agreement: "the Court need not address any potential infirmities with the State's regulatory 
authority because Idaho Power previously agreed to the State's regulatory authority over its 
claims as part of the settlement despite its challenges to its authority in the context of these 
proceedings.,,14 
In this case, Idaho Power is taking the same positions before this Court that the Company 
asserted before the SRBA court, and that the SRBA court rejected. Idaho Power is once again 
attempting to distance itself from I.e. § 42-203B, once again arguing that the statute means 
something other than what it plainly states, once again arguing that the intent of the statute is 
something different from the intent as explained by its own attorney to the Senate Resources 
Committee in 1985, and once again arguing that the statute violates Idaho Power's constitutional 
rights. Idaho Power is once again taking a stand directly contrary to what it told the Legislature 
in 1985, and seeking a judicial ruling that will allow it to retain all of the benefits of the Swan 
Falls Agreement and yet be released from its obligations under the Agreement. 
This Court should reject Idaho Power's recycled arguments for the same reasons the 
SRBA court rejected them. As the SRBA court determined, Idaho Power helped draft the 
statute; it is clear and unambiguous and reflects the intent of Idaho Power and the State; its 
enactment was a term and condition of the Swan Falls Agreement; and as a term of the 
Agreement, Idaho Power conceded to the State's regulatory authority under I.e. § 42-203B and 
agreed not to challenge the statute. As clearly and unambiguously set forth in the Swan Falls 
14 SRBA Memorandum Decision at 45. 
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Agreement and in I.e. § 42-203B(6), the intent of the Legislature and of the parties to the Swan 
Falls Agreement was that the Department would be authorized to impose a term condition on a 
hydropower water right at the time of licensing, even if there was no such condition in the 
permit. Idaho Power's attorney Tom Nelson expressly confirmed this intent in explaining the 
legislation and the overall settlement when they were the subject of intense legislative scrutiny. 
Idaho Power's new position on the effect and legislative intent of the statute should be rejected 
as contrary to the plain language of the statute and of the Agreement as explained to the 
Legislature. 
2. Legislative Intent of Idaho Code § 42-203B(7). 
An examination of the legislative history of subsection (7) shows this provision was not 
intended to preclude term conditions at licensing but rather was the outgrowth of a compromise 
reached between the parties to the Swan Falls Agreement and the small hydropower interests 
represented by John Runft regarding the length of term conditions. 
When originally enacted in Senate Bill 1008, I.e. § 42-203B contained just subsections 
(1) through (6). However, House Bill 186, passed later in the same legislative session, added 
subsection (7) to I.e. § 42-203B. As discussed in the Department's opening brief, John Runft, 
an attorney representing small hydropower interests, testified before the Senate committee 
considering Senate Bill 1008. He noted that I.e. § 42-203B(6) expressly prevented term 
conditions from being added to existing licenses - or as he described it, I.e. § 42-203B(6) 
expressly "grandfathered existing licenses." Runft asked the legislative committee to change 
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I.C. § 42-203B(6) so that existing permits would be "grandfathered as well as licenses.,,15 This 
proposed change was rejected based upon the State of Idaho's opposition. 16 
In the same hearing, Runft also sought to add guidance to I.C § 42-203B on how the 
Director would determine the length of the terms. The small hydropower users were concerned 
that if the Director sets a term condition when a permit is first issued, it might inadvertently 
restrict the length of time the hydropower user would have to get an adequate return on its 
investment. Through his written testimony before the Senate Committee, Runft testified: 
Lenders and investors will simply not invest in a project where the underlying 
water right is subject to delimitation at any time by act of the director. Short term 
water rights (around 5 years) to cover the period of return of capital or pay-off of 
the development loan will likewise not suffice. 
* * * 
Also, there are the terms of the power contracts to be considered. Virtually all of 
, the contracts for sale of power with the major power companies necessarily 
contain severe recapture provisions if there is a default in the supply of power 
during the term of the contract, which is generally 35 years in length. To put it 
bluntly, time limitations on the water rights for power purposes will reek havoc on 
the projects of small hydro developers. 
* * * 
We recommend that the statutory language be amended to require that limitation 
of a permit or license for power purposes shall not be for a term less than the term 
of the standard power purchase contract of the utility designated by the water 
right holder as the utility with which it will seek a power purchase contract. In 
the event there be no standard power purchase contract or standard contract term 
15 Attachment to Senate Resources and Environment Committee Minutes (Jan. 21, 1985), entitled "Revised 
and Supplemented Testimony By John L. Runft Before the Idaho Senate Committee on Resources and Environment 
January, 21, 1985," p. 5 (attached the Department's opening brief as Addendum E). 
16 Attachment to Senate Resources and Environment Committee Minutes (Jan. 25, 1985) entitled 
"Supplemental Testimony of Attorney General Jim Jones before the Idaho Senate Committee of Resources and 
Environment," pp. 1, 3. The testimony of Jim Jones was inadvertently left out of Addendum E of the Department's 
opening brief. Thus, the Department is now attaching it separately to this brief as Addendum L. 
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available as regards the designated utility, then, in the alternative, the water rights 
should be for 35 years, which term appears to be the industry standard.!7 
Subsequent to this testimony, agreement was reached between Runft, Idaho Power and 
the State of Idaho to add subsection (7) to I.e. § 42-203B. As the legislative history provides, 
subsection (7) was added to address Runft's concern about the length of the term and to give the 
Department criteria to establish term conditions. The title of the act shows that subsection (7) 
was not intended to limit the application of term conditions to just permits as argued by Idaho 
Power. The title to House Bill 186 states that the purpose of the act was "[t]o provide factors the 
Director of the Department of Water Resources is to consider in limiting permits or licenses for 
power purposes to a specific term.,,!8 The written analysis of the bill also shows that its intent 
was narrow: "The purpose of these amendments is to make sure the director does not 
inadvertently set too short a period of time in the permit or license, thus preventing the financing 
of small hydropower projects.,,19 
In his written testimony before the committee, Runft stated, "Subsection (7) solves an 
important procedural problem arising out of the diacotomy [sic] presented by the granting of 
permits on one hand and licenses on the other.,,2o The "dichotomy" rises out of the difference 
between permits and licenses. A permit authorizes someone to begin development on a project. 
17 Revised and Supplemented Testimony by John L. Runft at 3-4 (attached as part of Addendum E to the 
Department's opening brief). 
18 Idaho H. 186, 1985 Leg., 48th Sess. 1 (attached hereto as Addendum M). 
19 ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 186 I: Attachment to Minutes of H. Comm. On Res. & Conservation, 1985 Leg., 
48th SESS., 1 (Mar. 6, 1985) (attached hereto as Addendum N). 
20 Statement By John L. Runft: Attached to Minutes of H. Comm. On Res. & Conservation, 1985 Leg., 48th 
Sess.3 (Feb. 15, 1985) (attached hereto as Addendum 0). 
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In contrast, a license is issued after the project is built, the water has been put to beneficial use 
and entire license process is complete. With a permit, a water user might not start putting water 
to beneficial use five or possibly ten years after the permit was first approved. 
Runft recognized that with new permits, it might be years until the hydropower project 
was complete and water was being beneficially used to generate power. Subsection (7) was 
added to ensure that the term condition would not start running from the time the permit was 
issued but instead would run from the time the water was put to beneficial use, as Runft's 
explanation to the committee makes clear: 
In exercising his authority to limit such a permit or license to a specific term of 
years, the term of years so designated shall apply only to the license, even through 
the designation may be first stated in the permit. Hence, if a permit is "proved 
up" and the water put to beneficial use within the permit period, then the term of 
years granted by the director will commence to run for purposes of the license. 
The license granted will refer back to the date of aPflication to beneficial use as 
the time of the commencement of the license term. 2 
Runft's testimony highlights that the intent of subsection (7) was not to restrict the State's 
ability to add to license, but was to allow the term length to either be set or adjusted at the time 
of licensing based upon when the water was first put to beneficial use. This does not remove the 
Director's authority to add term conditions at the time of licensing. Idaho Power's argument that 
the intent of subsection (7) was to prevent the Director from adding term conditions at the time 
of licensing is contrary to the legislative history. 
The fact the State of Idaho supported the changes brought about by addition of 
21 [d. at 3. 
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subsection (7) is significant. If it had been the intent of the changes to undo the State's authority 
to limit or prevent the issuance of term conditions on existing permits at time of licensing, the 
State would undoubtedly have fought against the legislation as it is clear the State viewed the 
ability to add conditions in hydropower licenses as important to prevent future Swan Falls type 
disputes. This was explained by Pat Kole, the attorney who negotiated the Swan Falls settlement 
on behalf of the Attorney General, when responding to questions about proposed section 42-
203B(6) during a Senate committee hearing on the legislation in 1985: "The effort here was to 
make sure that as best we can foresee we do not get ourselves into another Swan Falls situation 
in the future. That is the reason why [proposed Idaho Code § 42-203B(6)] is in the agreement 
and why we think it is necessary.22 
Ironically, as discussed in the prior section, Idaho Power's attorney Tom Nelson stated 
that I.C § 42-203B as enacted would apply to existing hydropower permits. Now Idaho Power 
seeks to preclude the State from exercising authority the Company conceded to as part of the 
Swan Falls settlement. Given the intensity of the Swan Falls conflict, it is inconceivable the 
State would have acquiesced to this amendment to I.C § 42-203B after obtaining Idaho Power's 
concession to the State's authority to insert conditions in existing permits at the time of licensing. 
Idaho Power now seeks to deprive the State of the authority the State sought to preclude future 
Swan Falls controversies. The State of Idaho would not have supported language that undercut 
the very protections it was seeking. 
22 Transcript of Senate Resources & Environment Committee Meeting (Jan. 18, 1985), at 42-43 (attached the 
Department's opening brief as Addendum H). 
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Moreover, if the intent of House Bill 186 had been to preclude the Department from 
adding conditions at licensing, then the bill would simply have deleted the words "or licenses" 
from Section (6) - but it did not. Similarly, if House Bil1186 had been understood to preclude 
insertion of conditions at licensing, then the legislative history for House Bill 186 would have 
specifically so recognized - but it did not. In short, had the Legislature intended to prevent new 
conditions at licensing, there was a very easy way to amend the statute to unequivocally do just 
that, but that is not what the Legislature did, and that is not how House Bill 186 was explained to 
the Legislature. 
C. IDAPA 37.03.08.050.03 IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE IT ADDRESSES 
ONL Y PERMITS AND IS SILENT AS TO LICENSES. 
Idaho Power argues that IDAPA 37.03.08.050.03 prevents the Department from inserting 
a term condition at licensing. This argument is misplaced as IDAPA 37.03.08.050.03 explains 
how the Department will issue term conditions on permits but does not address licenses. IDAPA 
37.03.08.050.03 provides, "A permit issued for hydropower purposes shall contain a term 
condition on the hydropower use in accordance with Section 42-203B(6), Idaho Code." 
(Emphasis added). A water right permit and a water right license are not the same thing. By its 
plain reading, the rule applies to permits only. The rule does not address term conditions 
inserted in a license. Moreover, if one views the rules in their entirety, one can see that the rules 
establish the process for issuing permits. The rules do not limit the Department's ability to 
include term condition at the time of licensing. Idaho Power suggests that the lack of a rule 
about inserting a term condition in a license prevents the Department from including a term 
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condition in a license. Where there is statutory authority to insert a term condition into a license, 
however, a rule is not needed to be able to effectuate the statute. 
D. IDAHO POWER'S DELAY ARGUMENT VIOLATES THE GOOD FAITH 
OBLIGATION OF THE SWAN FALLS AGREEMENT BECAUSE AS A 
TERM OF THE AGREEMENT, IDAHO POWER CONCEDED TO AND 
AGREED NOT TO CHALLENGE THE APPLICATION OF IDAHO 
CODE § 42-203B TO ITS WATER RIGHTS. 
Idaho Power's argument that the Department delayed too long in licensing water right 
03-7018 is based on a repudiation of the terms of the Swan Falls Agreement and is a violation of 
its express obligation of good faith. As previously discussed, the enactment of I.C. § 42-203B 
was a condition of the Agreement?3 Further, the SRBA court determined that Idaho Power 
helped draft the statute, that the statute is clear and unambiguous, and that as a term of the 
Agreement, Idaho Power conceded to and agreed not to challenge the statute.24 
The "Good Faith" provision of the Swan Falls Agreement provides that the "State and 
Company shall not take any position before ... any court ... which is inconsistent with the 
terms of this agreement.,,25 In this case, Idaho Power clearly is taking a position before this 
Court that is inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement. Idaho Power is not only arguing 
against application of the plain statutory language that it helped draft and supported in the 
Legislature as a term of the Swan Falls Agreement, but Idaho Power is directly challenging the 




Swan Falls Agreement <Jm 4, 13, 17. SRBA Memorandum Decision at 9, 11,22,26. 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 1,22,31,32,45,46. 
Swan Falls Agreement <Jl 4. 
-14-
conceded to and agreed not to challenge the application of the State's regulatory authority under 
I.e.§ 42-203B to Idaho Power's water rights.26 In short, as the SRBA court has held, Idaho 
Power was "fully aware its rights were subject to [I.e. § 42-203B] despite whatever perception 
Idaho Power has with respect to the State's subsequent conduct or representations.',27 Because 
Idaho Power's licensing delay argument is directly contrary to the plain language of the 
Agreement, it a clear breach of the Agreement's obligation of "Good Faith," and a repudiation of 
the Agreement's terms. 
As the SRBA court stated, the Company was "fully aware" that I.C. § 42-203B(6) would 
apply to its hydropower water rights. Idaho Power's attorney confirmed this awareness when he 
testified to the Senate Resources Committee that the intent of I.C. § 42-203B(6) was to allow the 
Department to impose new conditions on a hydropower water right at licensing that had not been 
in the permit: the Agreement expressly provides that its sets forth all of the parties' 
understandings,28 but contains no exception for permit 03-7018 with respect to the application of 
I.e. § 42-203B.29 Indeed, as previously discussed, the fact that the Legislature declined to 
amend I.e. § 42-203B(6) to "grandfather" existing permits left no doubt that water right 03-7018 




SRBA Memorandum Decision at 26,31,45,46. 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 45. 
Swan Falls Agreement 'Il19. 
29 See SRBA Memorandum Decision at 47 (rejecting the "block of water" argument because, among other 
reasons, "[n]o promises of guarantees were made to Idaho Power with respect to the availability of excess flows."). 
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Thus, not only did any licensing delay cause no harm or prejudice to Idaho Power, but 
Idaho Power's attempt to preclude the Director from imposing a term condition pursuant to I.e. 
§ 42-203B(6) is fundamentally at odds with the clear terms of the Swan Falls Agreement. Idaho 
Power cannot plausibly claim otherwise, as the SRBA court's holdings on the Agreement have 
already foreclosed the incorrect arguments and flawed interpretations on which the Company 
relies in this case. 
E. IDAHO POWER WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY DELAY IN ISSUANCE OF 
THE LICENSE. 
Idaho Power claims the Swan Falls Agreement and the pendency of the SRBA do not 
explain the reason for the delay in issuing the license. Response Brief at 35. The SRBA and 
anticipated litigation over the Swan Falls Agreement are only two of the reasons why the 
issuance of the license was delayed. Another important reason is that the Department prioritizes 
new permits and transfers over water rights waiting for licensing. New permits take priority 
because until a permit is approved, a water user cannot begin to divert water at all. A similar 
problem arises with transfers. Until a transfer is approve, a water user seeking to move a water 
right to a new location cannot do so until the transfer is approved. Backlogs in permit and 
transfers approvals stifle economic development if the Department does not rapidly process the 
approval. The licensing of water rights is less critical because there is nothing that prevents the 
water user from continuing to use the water while the right is waiting to be licensed. 
Consequently, new permits and transfers are given a higher priority. Idaho Power can point to 
no prejudice from this delay as it has been able to generate power during the time of processing 
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of its license and will continue to be able to generate throughout the term of its FERC license 
regardless of the cause for delay in the issuance of this license. 
Moreover, even assuming the Department could have issued the license immediately after 
the beneficial use field exam was completed, it still would have been issued after the passage of 
I.C. § 42-203B. The statutory changes to I.C. §42-203B became effective on July 1, 1985. The 
beneficial use exam was completed on September 8, 1985. (Agency R. pp. 88-98.) Thus, even if 
the Department had issued the license once the beneficial use exam was completed, the statute 
authorizing the inclusion of the term condition was already in effect. Idaho Power is in the same 
position today as it would have been if the Department had licensed the water right in 1985 after 
the completion of the beneficial use exam. 
What the Swan Falls Agreement and the SRBA discussion in the Department's opening 
brief explains is why both Idaho Power and the State of Idaho were in no hurry to dig up the past 
on the Swan Falls Agreement and to litigate issues of subordination and term conditions. If 
Idaho Power felt the Department unreasonably delayed the issuance of the license, it could have 
expressed that displeasure to the Department. Such communication would have been in the 
license file for this water right and now a part of the agency record. There is no such 
communication in the file or the agency record. The Legislature has also provided a legal 
remedy to those who feel that an agency is not complying with its statutory duty by providing for 
a writ of mandate pursuant to Title 7 of Idaho Code. Idaho Power did not avail itself of this 
remedy either. 
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F. THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS A NARROW QUESTION 
REGARDING LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THIS COURT TO DETERMINE WHEN A WATER RIGHT VESTS. 
Idaho Power argues that "the resounding question before the court is at what point does 
an applicant, permittee, or licensee, obtain a protectable property interest in its water right 
whereby the Department cannot arbitrarily change the terms and conditions of the permit." 
Response Brief at 24. This is not the issue before this Court. This case deals with the narrow 
issue of I.e. § 42-203B and whether the Legislature intended to give the Director the statutory 
authority to add a term condition in a hydropower water right at licensing. Even if, for the sake 
of argument, one assumes that submission of proof of beneficial use provides a water user with a 
vested water right (a position the State strongly disagrees with), the Legislature has express 
constitutional authority to "regulate and limit" hydropower water rights under Idaho Constitution 
Article XV, § 3, and it has done so through the enactment of I.e. § 42-203B. If the Legislature 
passes a statute that a water user believes unconstitutionally impacts a vested property right, the 
remedy for the water user is to bring a separate action to seek compensation for a taking. Cf 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 216, 912 P.2d 100, 102 (1996) ("while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking."). 
For purposes of this appeal, it simply does not matter if or when Idaho Power may have 
acquired a vested right in the permit because the State has express constitutional and statutory 
authority to "regulate and limit" hydropower water rights, ID. CONST. ART. XV, § 3, and the 
Legislature exercised the authority to regulate and limit hydropower water rights by passing I.C. 
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§ 42-20B(6). Further, as a term of the Swan Falls Agreement, Idaho Power waived any right to 
bring a takings claim based on any alleged deprivation of a property interest resulting from the 
application of I.e. § 42-203B(6) to the Company's water rights. See SRBA Memorandum 
Decision at 45 ("the Court need not address any potential infirmities with the State's regulatory 
authority because Idaho Power previously agreed to the State's regulatory authority over its 
claims as part of the settlement despite its challenges to its authority in the context of these 
proceedings. "). 
G. EVEN IF THIS COURT GETS TO THE ISSUE OF WHEN A WATER 
RIGHT VESTS, THE CASES CITED AND RELIED UPON BY IDAHO 
POWER AND THE DISTRICT COURT DO NOT STAND FOR THE 
PROPOSITION THAT A HYDROPOWER WATER USER'S PERMIT 
VESTS PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE LICENSING PROCESS. 
Idaho Power argues that many Idaho cases suggest that "once a party had done all that it 
can do to be in full compliance with Idaho Code § 42-219" (i.e., submits proof of beneficial use 
to the Department), the water right vests even though the licensing process is not complete. 
Response Brief at 30. Even if this Court were to get to the issue of when a water right vests, the 
cases cited by Idaho Power either are irrelevant or do not stand for the proposition that a water 
right vests upon submission of proof of beneficial use. 
The Department agrees with the general proposition cited by Idaho Power that it is 
presumed that the legislature does not intend to overturn "long established principles of law" 
without expressing the clear intent to do so. Response Brief at 25. The problem with applying 
this maxim to this case is that there are no "long established principles of law" providing that a 
water user has a protectable interest in a permit once the water right holder submits proof of 
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beneficial use to the Department or when water is put to beneficial use. In fact, the cases cited 
by Idaho Power and the District Court suggest otherwise. The first case discussed by Idaho 
Power is United States v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho lO6, 157 P.3d 600 (2007). This case does 
not address I.C. § 42-203B, nor does it discuss the issue of when a water right becomes a vested 
right. Pioneer, instead, addresses the question of who holds title to a water right. While the 
diversion of water and its application to beneficial use are important in the process of 
establishing a water right, it is a leap in logic to say this means that a water user is entitled to 
some sort of quasi-vested water right without completing the steps in the statutory appropriation 
process. 
In its discussion on vesting, Idaho Power ignores the case Big Wood Canal Co. v. 
Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 401-02,263 P. 45,52 (1927). In Big Wood Canal Co., the Idaho 
Supreme Court examined Idaho's application and permit process when the Big Wood Canal 
Company brought suit to have its water rights decreed. The predecessor of the Big Wood Canal 
Company was issued a water right permit in February of 1906?O Proof of completion of works 
was due before February 17, 1911, and proof of application of water to the proposed use was due 
before February 17, 1915?! Proof of completion of works was submitted timely, but proof of 
application was not submitted until 1921, six years after the time permitted by the statutes in 




Big Wood Canal Co., 45 Idaho at 385, 263 P. at 46. 
/d. 
/d., 45 Idaho at 393, 263 P. at49. 
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amended the deadline to submit proof of application of the water in 1913 and 1915, allowing for 
extensions for filing proof of application of the water to a beneficial use. The Department of 
Reclamation (the Department's predecessor) had granted a number of extensions based upon the 
new legislation?3 The interveners challenged Big Wood Canal Company's water right by 
arguing that the laws in effect when the application was issued should have been applied at 
licensing and that the subsequent legislative changes extending deadlines were improper: 
[A]ppellants urge that the statutes as they existed at the time of respondent's 
application for permit, and at the time of appellants' applications for permit, being 
the laws in force prior to 1913, constitute a contract between the state of Idaho 
and each of said appellants; that the Legislature could not thereafter change the 
laws so as to extend additional favors to respondent so as to give it a property 
right which it could not have obtained under the laws as they existed at the time 
the respondent made its application, or at the time when the appellants secured 
their permits, when the effect of such legislation would be to deprive the 
appellants of their water rights which they had acquired under existing laws of the 
state.34 
The Court found no direct authority on this issue, so instead turned to what it viewed as 
analogous situations where deadlines for actions had been extended.35 Most of the cases 
examined by the Court dealt with inchoate rights and the effect of the modification of deadlines. 
The court ultimately concluded that the Legislature's extension of the time to file proof of 






/d. 45 Idaho at 396, 263 P. at 50. 
/d., 45 Idaho at 398, 263 P. at 51. 
/d., 45 Idaho at 401-402,263 P. at 52. 
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that until there is complete compliance with all the statutory licensing steps, the water right does 
not vest?7 
Admittedly, the factual situation is different in this case. Big Wood addresses a change in 
the statute while a water right was still in the permit stage. Nonetheless, the Court's analysis of 
the very nature of a permit and when it vests is applicable. The Idaho Constitution provides that 
the Legislature may regulate the appropriation and use of public waters. ID. CONST. ART. XV, § 
1. Big Wood Canal Co. holds that where the Legislature exercises this authority and puts in 
place a process to grant a property right, the property right does not become fully vested until the 
process is complete. 
The cases cited by Idaho Power in its Response Brief do not stand for the proposition that 
a water right vests upon the water user submitting proof of beneficial use to the Department. In 
fact, they lead one to just the opposite conclusion. For example, in Hidden Springs Trout Ranch 
v. Allred, the Court specifically recognized that a water right will vest only upon "proper 
statutory adherence." 38 As discussed in A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls 
Ground Water Dist., proper statutory adherence requires the issuance of a license?9 Until that 
time, the water user does not have a vested water right.4o 
37 [d. 
38 Hidden Springs Trout Ranch v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 625, 636 P.2d 745, 747 (1981). 




Idaho Power also suggests the Department incorrectly cites the holding in In Re SRBA 
Case No. 39576 (Subcase No. 36-08099).41 The Department has correctly cited the holding of 
that case. The application for permit was filed by River Grove Farms, Inc. ("River Grove"), and 
the application was approved by IDWR with a subordination provision in it. However, River 
Grove challenged the inclusion of the subordination provision at licensing, arguing that the 
Department lacked the statutory authority to insert the subordination provision at the time of 
permitting and because of this, the Department could not apply I.e. § 42-203B retroactively to a 
vested right. Then-presiding judge of the SRBA, the Hon. Barry Wood, ruled that, on the 
contrary, a water right vests when a license is issued. Judge Wood held: 
[I]t is clear that the legislature intended the issuance of the license to mark the 
point at which a water right becomes vested. 
Once the works are completed, the applicant must file proof of completion with 
IDWR, and IDWR will conduct a field examination thereof. I.e. § 42-217. 
IDWR is then to carefully examine the evidence proving beneficial use, and if 
satisfied, issues a license confirming the water right. I.e. § 42-219. If IDWR 
finds that the applicant has not fully complied with the law and the conditions of 
the permit, IDWR may refuse to issue the license. I.C. § 42-219(6). Once the 
license is issued, I.e. § 42-220 states that '[s]uch license shall be binding upon the 
state as to the right of such licensee to use the amount of water mentioned therein, 
and shall be prima facie evidence as to such right .... ' It is clear from this 
statutory scheme that it is the intent of the legislature that all of the steps --
including issuance of the license -- be completed before the water right vests, and 
until such time the right to the use of water remains an inchoate right. Because 
I.C. § 42-219(6) gives IDWR the responsibility to find the facts as to whether the 
41 In Re SRBA Case No. 39576 (Subcase No. 36-08099), Memorandum Decision and Order on Challenge; 
Order on State ofIdaho's Motion to Dismiss Claimants Notice of Challenge, Snake River Basin Adjudication 
District Court Subcase 36-08099 (Jan. 11, 2000)(hereinafter "River Grove"), a copy of which was attached as 
Addendum K to the Department's opening brief. 
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permit conditions were complied with, it is untenable to assert that a water right 
may vest prior to this step in the permit and licensing process.42 
As Judge Wood makes clear in River Grove, all steps of the licensing process must be 
complete before a water right fully vests. Simply putting water to beneficial use is not sufficient 
to vest a water right. 
Even if Idaho Power believes that Judge Wood's discussion on vesting is dicta, Idaho 
Power fails to address the fact that another SRBA judge agreed with Judge Wood's rationale in 
another case that presented the very issue of when a water right vests. In his Order Granting 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Mandate issued January 25,2008, the Hon. John M. 
Melanson considered a case in which the petitioner held a hydropower permit that was issued 
prior to the passage of I.e. § 42-203B.43 Following enactment of 42-203B(6), the Department 
imposed a limited subordination condition on petitioner's permit. Later, when the Department 
announced that it was prepared to issue the license, it invited comment as to whether the 
subordination condition should be broadened to include aquifer recharge. The petitioners argued 
that the Director could not modify a condition on a permit when issuing a license, and that the 
issuance of a license was a ministerial act. Judge Melanson determined that issuing a license is 
not a ministerial act but rather one requiring the Director to exercise discretion in whether to 
42 River Grove. at 24-25 (emphasis added). 
43 North Side Canal Co. v. Idaho Dept. a/Water Resources, Jerome County Case No. CV 2007-1093 (Jan. 25, 
2008) (hereinafter "North Side Canal Co.") a copy of which was attached as Addendum J to the Department's 
opening brief. 
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issue a license or not.44 In reaching that conclusion, Judge Melanson agreed with Judge Wood's 
conclusion that a water right vests at the time the license is issued. Judge Melanson found Judge 
Wood's decision "to be on point and persuasive.,,45 Judge Melanson stated: 
This Court holds that following the beneficial use examination the issuance of the 
license is not a ministerial act. The Department must first make a determination 
whether the use complies with the law and the terms of the permit. While the 
Court does have some concern with the length of time it takes for IDWR to 
complete its final determination and issue the license the statute does not provide 
for a time limit. 46 
These two decisions therefore hold that a water right vests only when the license is issued 
and stand in stark contrast to the proposition claimed by Idaho Power that a water right vests as 
soon as water is put to beneficial use. 
Idaho Power also argues that the Court should consider the SRBA district court case 
Riley v. Rowan as authority for preventing the Department from inserting a term condition in 
water right no. 03-7018.47 Response Brief at 33. Riley v. Rowan is distinguishable from the 
current case and lacks a sound legal basis for the remedy reached by the judge. First, even by the 
test set out by the judge in Riley, the case is not applicable here. In Riley, the judge specifically 
limited the scope of the decision, saying it applied only "where a license issued is consistent with 
the terms of the permit application, the permit and IDWR's examination .... " (Appeal R., p. 
44 North Side Canal Co., at 12. 
45 [d. 
46 North Side Canal Co., at 12. 
47 Memorandum Decision in Riley v. Rowan, Case No. 39576, Subcase No. 94-12 (Aug. 28,1997), Fifth 
Judicial District Court in and for the State of Idaho, a copy of which can be found in the Record on Appeal at pp. 
210-223. 
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221.) The test established by the court is not met in this case. Here, the permit and license are 
different. This Court should also discount Riley for the lack of legal analysis. There, the district 
court failed to explain the legal underpinnings of its decision, and the decision lacks an analysis 
of the district court's authority to fashion the remedy reached. It is also important to note that on 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, this Court specifically declined to address the issuance of the 
license, affirming the district court's decision on other grounds. Riley v. Rowan, 131 Idaho 831, 
834,965 P.2d 191, 194 (1998) ("Additionally, having determined that Jim Howe and Rowan 
were tenants in common, each owning a one-half interest in water license No. 22-07280, we 
decline to address whether the IDWR breached its statutory duty by delaying the issuance of the 
license."). 
In collective review, reading the Supreme Court cases cited by Idaho Power and the 
district court in the case do not lead to the conclusion that there is a "long established principle of 
law" providing that a water user has a protectable interest in a permit once they submit proof of 
beneficial use or put the water to beneficial use. In fact, the cases lead to the opposite 
conclusion. This is further evidenced by the fact that two SRBA district court judges reviewing 
the same cases agreed that a water right does not vest until a license is issued. While not directly 
on all fours with this case, Big Wood is instructive and stands for the proposition that until the 
licensing process is complete, the Legislature is well within its power to change the licensing 
process. Thus, legislative authorization to include reasonable term conditions into a hydropower 
water right at the time of licensing does not interfere with a vested interest. 
-26-
H. THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD IDAHO POWER'S IMPROPER 
ATTEMPTS TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD. 
Judicial review of disputed facts must be confined to the agency record. I.e. § 67-5277. 
As such, briefs in appellate proceedings should not include new factual evidence not present in 
the underlying agency record. Through its brief, Idaho Power improperly attempts to augment 
the record before this Court with new factual evidence not present in the agency record. 
Specifically, Addendums 1-5 of Idaho Power's response brief present new documents related to 
other hydropower water rights that were not present in the agency record. 48 In turn, Idaho 
Power asks this Court to consider legal argument related to those documents and to use the 
documents to draw conclusions regarding IDWR's understanding of its own authorities. 
Response Brief at 20. This Court should reject Idaho Power's attempts to improperly augment 
the record as these documents were never made part of the record in this matter before the 
agency and neither has Idaho Power sought to augment the records as provided by Idaho 
Appellate Rule 30. Idaho Power should not be allowed to improperly augment the record in this 
manner, and the Court should strike or disregard any argument related to these documents. 
I. THE LICENSING DOCUMENTS REVIEWED BY IDAHO POWER ARE 
NOT RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING. 
Idaho Power undertakes an historical review of Department records to patch together an 
argument regarding what it states is the Department's understanding of the application of I.e. § 
48 The Addendums included by the Department in its opening brief are appropriate as they do not represent 
factual evidence but represent lower court decisions related to this case and documented legislative history. The 
Court is free to take judicial notice of the legislative history of statutes it is examining. Knight v. Employment Sec. 
Agency, 88 Idaho 262, 266, 398 P.2d 643, 645 (1965) 
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42-203B. Response Brief at 19-23. The licensing documents reviewed by Idaho Power are 
either irrelevant or do not speak to the Department's interpretation of I.e. § 42-203B. 
Idaho Power spends considerable time discussing water right license nos. 29-7578, 29-
7772,32-7128,32-7136,47-7768 and 1_7010.49 These water right licenses simply are not 
relevant to this case. Contrary to Idaho Power's suggestion, the first five licenses say nothing of 
the Department's understanding of its authority to add term conditions at the time of licensing. 
Just because the Department included term conditions in the permits for these water rights, does 
not mean that the Department believes it lacks the authority to add term conditions at licensing. 
While the Department did add a term condition to the sixth license (license no. 1-7010) after it 
was permitted, the condition was added after the applicant filed an application to amend the 
permit. Just because the Department added a term condition in response to an application to 
amend the permit, it does not follow that the Department believes it lacks the authority to insert 
term conditions at the time of licensing. 
Idaho Power also brings up water right license no. 65-12096 and argues that because the 
Department decided not to exercise its authority to add a term condition at the time of licensing 
proves the Department believes it lacks the authority to do so. Again, this is an incorrect 
assumption by Idaho Power. The fact the Department decided not to exercise its authority to add 
a term condition in this license does not mean the Department believes it lacks the authority to 
49 Should the Court decide that the records relied upon by Idaho Power to make this argument are not 
properly part of the record as suggested in part H above, the Court would not need to consider this part of Idaho 
Power's argument. 
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do so. The Department did not state why it decided not to exercise its authority in this case and 
any discussion by Idaho Power on this issue is speculation not supported by the record. 
J. THIS CASE IS NOT A REFERENDUM ON THE DEPARTMENT'S 
AUTHORITY TO ADD CONDITIONS ON ALL WATER RIGHTS. 
Idaho Power also tries to expand this case into a review of the State's authority to include 
conditions on all water rights. It suggests "The licensing process for a hydropower water right is 
the same statutory process employed by the Director to license any other type of water right." 
Response Brief at 10. This is simply incorrect. I.e. § 42-203B does not apply to other types of 
water rights. It applies only to hydropower water rights. This code section implements the 
State's authority to "regulate and limit" hydropower water rights under Idaho Constitution 
Article XV, § 3 and was passed in recognition of the potential impact hydropower could have on 
water resource development absent state regulation. Because hydropower facilities are generally 
constructed to use most of the flow of a river, unconditioned hydropower water rights would 
preclude future use of the water resource. Because this authority applies only to hydropower 
water rights, there is no basis for Idaho Power's contentions that the Director's licensing order 
poses a dire threat to all water rights generally. 
K. THE PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW PROVIDED IN THE TERM 
CONDITION PROVIDES A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO ISSUES 
RAISED BY HAVING A HYDROPOWER WATER RIGHT TERMINATE 
ON A SPECIFIC DATE. 
In Idaho Power's license, the Department included a term condition providing for 
consideration of the public interest. The condition provides: 
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The diversion and use of water for hydropower purposes under this license is 
subject to review by the Director after the date of expiration of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission license for Brownlee Dam. Upon appropriate findings 
relative to the interest of the public, the Director may cancel all or any part of the 
use authorized herein and may revise, delete or add conditions under which the 
. h b . d 50 fIg t may e exercIse . 
Idaho Power argues that the Department exceeded its authority by inserting a condition 
that subjects the license to a public interest review. Idaho Power argues the Department only has 
the authority to designate a specific term of years in the term conditon. Response at 14. There 
are several very practical reasons why the Department does not designate a specific expiration 
for the license - and these reasons work to the benefit of the hydropower license holder. First, if 
a hydropower license expires on a specific date, the water right holder would then have to file a 
new application for permit if they want to continue generating power at the facility. Importantly, 
a new application means a new priority date. With a specific expiration date, the license holder 
loses the benefit of their earlier priority date. The Department includes the public interest review 
instead of including a fixed expiration date to allow the hydropower owner to maintain their 
priority date. Furthermore, the water right holder would have to pay new fees associated with a 
new the application and they would have to go through the entire licensing process again. This 
would put additional burden on both the water right holder and the Department by creating 
significant work. Moreover, under a new water right application, a water right holder would 
have to meet public interest criteria as set forth in I.e. § 42-203A. The way the Department 
50 Water Right License No. 03-7018, R. p. 130. 
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conditions the water right allows the water user to keep their priority date, not have to pay new 
application fees, not have to jump through the hoops of paperwork and proving up on the water 
right, but would provide for a public interest review similar to that which the water right holder 
would have had to go through under a new application anyway. The Department's approach 
streamlines this process. 
Idaho Power also claims that application of this condition would not afford them due 
process. Idaho Power's claims of lack of due process are easily addressed. Any action by the 
Department is subject to hearing and judicial review pursuant to I.e. §§ 42-1701A and 67-5270. 
Thus, the Department would initiate an administrative proceeding before taking action on the 
water right or otherwise provide a process whereby Idaho Power and all interested parties could 
participate. If Idaho Power feels that the decision reached by the Department after the hearing is 
unconstitutional or arbitrary or capricious, it has full opportunity to challenge such action 
consistent with the review authorities provided by Idaho Code. Thus, Idaho Power would not be 
deprived of due process of law by applying the current condition. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language and legislative history of I.e. § 42-203B(6) show that it was the clear 
intent to authorize the Department to add term conditions in water rights at the time of licensing. 
This point was expressly explained to the Legislature by Idaho Power's own attorney. It is 
without question the intent of I.e. § 42-203B was to prevent future Swan Falls type disputes by 
giving the Department authority to limit hydropower licenses consistent with Idaho Constitution 
Article XV, § 3. Idaho Power's attempt to avoid the exercise of this authority does not find 
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support in the record and is expressly contrary to the Swan Falls Agreement. As was affirmed by 
the SRBA district court: "[The Agreement] also provided that the parties would propose and 
support legislation consistent with the provisions of the Framework, including what became I.e. 
§ 42-203B.,,51 Idaho Power helped draft the proposed hydropower legislation that was enacted 
as I.e. § 42-203B,52 and the proposed legislation "clearly and unambiguously reflects the intent 
of the parties.,,53 As a term and condition of the Agreement, Idaho Power agreed to the 
regulatory authority of the State as is now codified at I.e. § 42-203B.54 The "Good Faith" 
provision of the Swan Falls Agreement provides that the "State and Company shall not take any 
position before ... any court ... which is inconsistent with the terms of this agreement.,,55 In 
this case, Idaho Power clearly is taking a position before this Court that is inconsistent with the 
terms of the Agreement. Idaho Power should be estopped from challenging the inclusion of term 
conditions to this water right when it was clear to Idaho Power, as pointed out by their own 
representative, the intent of Idaho Code § 42-203B(6) was to authorize the Department to include 
term conditions in existing permits at the time of licensing. 
Claims that the delay in licensing prejudiced Idaho Power ring hallow. Idaho Power has 
not been prejudiced by the delay in licensing as the Company has been able to generate power 






SRBA Memorandum Decision, at 9. 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 38. 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 32. 
SRBA Memorandum Decision at 1. 
Swan Falls Agreement lj[ 4. 
-32-
throughout the term of its FERC license. Even if the Department issued the license immediately 
after the beneficial use field exam was submitted in 1985, the license would have still been 
issued after the effective date of I.e. § 42-203B. As such, the intervening years do not prejudice 
Idaho Power's legal position. 
The sole issue before this Court is whether I.C. § 42-203B authorizes the Department to 
add a term condition at the time of licensing. This Court does not need to examine the issue of 
when a water right vests to reach its decision in this case. The issue of vesting is a red herring 
floated by Idaho Power to distract this Court from the issue before it. The remedy, if one 
believes their property has been unconstitutionally impinged upon, it to bring a takings claim. 
Of course, Idaho Power may have forfeited this right because, as pointed out by the SRBA court, 
the Company previously agreed to the State's regulatory authority over its claims as part of the 
Swan Falls Agreement.56 
The Department respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the District 
Court and find that I.e. § 42-203B authorizes the Director to add a term condition to a 
hydropower water right at the time of licensing. 
56 SRBA Memorandum Decision at 45. 
-33-
,1"-
DATED thisZQday of July, 2010. 
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
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Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
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Supplemental Testimony of Attorney Gene~al Jim Jones 
Before the Idaho Senate Committee on 
Resources and Environment 
Subject: Comments of Attorney John L. Runft. 
On January 21, 1985, John L. Runft, Attorney at Law\ 
appeared before the Committee and provided an analysis of 
Sena.te Bills 1006 and 1008. It is important th~t the Committee 
carefully analyze Mr. Runft's testimony because it raises 
several concerns about the agreement. The concernS ra 1 sed by 
Mr-. Runft Were considered by the negotiators and were either 
rejected as incompatiblo with resolution of the Swan falls 
controversy or provided for by the mechanisms in the 
ag reement. It is my belief that upon careful reflection and 
thorough analysis that the Committee will find the points 
. 
advanced by Mr. Runft have b~en addressed. 
The £i rst general observation wade by Mr. Runft is that 
Senate Bill 1008 represents a hybrid that would be better left 
in tWo parts 1) t"esolution of the Sllan Falls contr-Qvetsy ~nd 2) 
standards and procedu'L"es for treating hydropower water rights. 
Mr. Runft's analysis is COTrect that the bill addresses both of 
these prob1ems. Yet I the two pToblerns are one in the same. 
Further, the r~a50n £01' the structure of the agreement is to 
prevent future Swan Falls types of situations ftom arising and 
-1-
• 
to provide a mechanism under which current Swan Falls type 
problems can be resolved without expensive litigation. As 
pointed out earlier, the Spokane River is a prime example of 
ana ther potent i al Swan Fall s type con trove rsy. The negot i a tors 
believed and sti 11 believe that a mechanisrn must be created in 
state law to provide a resolution process for addressing these 
problems. 
Mr. Runft's second suggestion is to create an exemption 
process whereby certain hydropower water rights could be 
specifically exempted from a subordination ~t"ovision. Sena.te 
Bill 1008 in conjunction with S.B. 1006 does in fact provide 
this type of mechanism. Under S.B. 1008 the director is 
granted the authority to specifically implement the 1928 
constitutional amendment and limit and regulate hydropower 
water rights. The director has in fact been subordinating 
hydropower water rights since 1977 and has iSSUed in exceSs of 
2 5 2 sue h rig h t s . Wh a t S • B ~ 100 8 and S • B • 1 00 6 do, i s t 0 
require the director to set forth in rule and regulation form, 
standards under which hydropower w~ter rights will or will not 
be SubOTdinated. Those t"ules and regUlations Will, of course, 
come back to the legiSlature fOT their review. In effect, 
these two bills accomplish precisely what Mr. Runft desires t 
that is, 1) certainty for the holder of a hydropower water 
right, and 2) a procedure for evaluating whether or not the 
director's determination is consistent with the intent of the 





Hr. Runft's third pOint is that the words "state action" in 
section 42-203B(3) is to broad. Unfortunately, the analysis 
over looks the fact that Ininimum stream flows can only be set 
in accordance with state law. The negotiators specifically 
chose the words flstate action" in contemplation of the passing 
of SJR 17 as this and future legislatures may wish to bec:ome 
more actively involved in the setting or review of minimu~ 
stream flows. We believe this latitude should he maintained. 
Mr. Runft next submits that the authority to subordinate 
the hydropower water rights granted to the director is to 
broad. As noted above, when read in conjunction with S.B.. 
1006, it is clear that the director will be required t·o set 
st?ndards that will be reviewed and analyzed by the Idaho 
Legislature. We suggest that the provision as currently 
phrased is adequate. 
Mr. Run£t next contends that the small hydro developer \vil! 
be unable to obtain fin~nciflg if the director has the authority 
to subordinate hydropower water rights. Th i s a r gum e n tis 
factually erroneoUS. To da te, as mentioned above, the 
Department has isslIed over 216 5ubor-dinated water rights for 
power purposeS, Not one of these projects had difficulty in 
obtaining financing and in fact many are noW' completing 
construction and are obtaining long·term financing. 
Mr. Runft's objection to term permits is also without 
meri t. The director has established a policy of issuing water 













Federal Energy Regulatory Commission license. To date both 
lenders and investors have found this practic~ to be 
sa ti s £ ac tory. We would strongly suggest that the original 
language remain in place as the factors cited by Mr. Runft are 
simply not accura te. Additionally. the director should 
maintain a certain amount of discretion in this area as the 
future predictability of the need fot electrical energy or the 
need for additional water for agricultural purposes becomes 
apparent over a period of time in the future. 
Mr. Runft nex:t argues that 42-203B(6) should be amended to 
not affect permits which have been issued as of this date. His 
analysis overlooks the Hidden Springs Trout Rand] case. ~ 102 
Idaho 623, which allOws the State to restrict permits that have 
not yet been fully developed into property rights. 
simply no taking issue presented by 42-Z03B(6). 
There is 
The same 
argument would apply to Mr. Runftls suggested clarification of 
4Z-203C(1). 
Mr. Runft next recommends the deletion of the statutory 
language in section 42 R 203C(2) relating to the weight to be 
given to the various public interest criteria. As indicated in 
the earlier testimony provided by Mr. Nelson to the Committee~ 
it is clear that if a factor does not apply. then the director 
would not consider it in making a determination. It IS 
c r i t 1 C ill t 0 a full and fa i r dec i s ion m a kin g pro c e sst ha t s 0 inC 
standard guiding the director in terms of weighing the various 





Section 42-203D relates to permits not put to beneficial 
usc p rio r t 0 Jan u a fy 1, 1 9 8 5 • 
that if agricultural permits 
relationship to the new law, 
should also be so re-evaluated. 
For consi stency sake we bel i eve 
are to be rc-e-valuateti in 
water rights for power purposes 
Fin a 11 Y t Mr. Run f t S U g g est 5 t ha t the authority of the 
director to suspend issuance of the permits 
should be limited to the geographical area 
or applications 
abo v e S \Va n Fall 5 
darn, Once again this argument overlooks the fact that Slian 
Falls types of problems are developiIlg throughout the State. 
Fun-her, before the director may suspend issuance of permits he 
must make a finding of need, which is subject to judicial 
review. Thus, it is imperative that this legislatut"e act to 
alleviate those type of problems now so that further problems 
are not brought forward and t of course, the resulting legal 






LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Forty-eighth Legislature First Regular Session - 1985 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 186, AS AMENDED 
BY RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT ----, 
2 RELATING TO WATER RIGHTS FOR HYDROPOWER PURPOSES; AMENDING CHAPTER 2, TITLE 
3 42, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 42-203B, IDAHO CODE, TO 
4 PROVIDE THAT THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES SHALL HAVE 
5 THE AUTHORITY TO SUBORDINATE RIGHTS GRANTED FOR POWER PURPOSES TO SUBSE-
6 QUENT UPSTREAM RIGHTS, TO LIMIT PERMITS OR LICENSES GRANTED FOR POWER PUR-
7 POSES TO A SPECIFIC TERM, AND TO PROVIDE FACTORS THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
8 DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES IS TO CONSIDER IN LIMITING PERMITS OR 
9 LICENSES FOR POWER PURPOSES TO A SPECIFIC TERM. 
10 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
11 SECTION 1. That Chapter 2, Title 42, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
12 hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be known and 
13 designated as Section 42-203B, Idaho Code, and to read as follows: 
14 42-203B. AUTHORITY TO SUBORDINATE RIGHTS -- NATURE OF SUBORDINATED WATER 
15 RIGHT AND AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH A SUBORDINATION CONDITION -- AUTHORITY TO 
16 LIMIT TERM OF PERMIT OR LICENSE. (1) The legislatulie. finds. and .~d·eclares that 
17 it is in the public interest to specifically implement the state's power to 
18 regulate and limit the use of water for power purposes and to define the rela-
19 tionship between the state and the holder of a water right for power purposes 
20 to the extent such right exceeds an established minimum flow. The purposes of 
21 the trust established by subsections (2) and (3) of this section are to assure 
22 an adequate supply of water for all future beneficial uses and to clarify and 
23 protect the right of a user of water for power purposes to continue using the 
24 water pending approval of depletionary future beneficial uses. 
25 (2) A water right for power purposes which is defined by agreement with 
26 the state as unsubordinated to the extent of a minimum flow established by 
27 state action shall remain unsubordinated as defined by the agreement. Any 
28 portion of the water rights for power purposes in excess of the level so 
29 established shall be held in trust by the state of Idaho, by and through the 
30 governor, for the use and benefit of the user of the water for power purposes, 
31 and of the people of the state of Idaho. The rights held in trust shall be 
32 subject to subordination to and depletion by future upstream beneficial users 
33 whose rights are acquired pursuant to state law. 
34 (3) Water rights for power purposes not defined by agreement with the 
35 state shall not be subject to depletion below any applicable minimum stream 
36 flow established by state action. Water rights for power purposes in excess 
37 of such minimum stream flow shall be held in trust by the state of Idaho, by 
38 and through the governor, for the use and benefit of the users of water for 
39 power purposes and of the people of the state of Idaho. The rights held in 
40 trust shall be subject to subordination to and depletion by future consumptive 
41 upstream beneficial user~ whose rights are acquired pursuant to state law. 
42 (4) The user of water for power purposes as beneficiary of the trust 
43 established in subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall be entitled to 
RS~1430El 
2 
1 use water available at its facilities to the extent of the water right, and to 
2 protect its rights to the use of the water as provided by state law against 
3 depletions or claims not in accordance with state law. 
4 (5) The governor or his designee is hereby authorized and empowered to 
5 enter into agreements with holders of water rights for power purposes to 
6 define that portion of their water rights at or below the level of the appli-
7 cable minimum stream flow as being unsubordinated to upstream beneficial uses 
8 and depletions, and to define such rights in excess thereof as being held in 
9 trust by the state under subsection (2) of this section. Such agreements 
10 shall be subject to ratification by law. The contract entered into by the 
11 governor and the Idaho Power Company on October 25, 1984, is hereby found and 
12 declared to be such an agreement, and the legislature hereby ratifies the 
13 governor's authority and power to enter into this agreement. 
14 (6) The director shall have the authority to subordinate the rights 
15 granted in a permit or license for power purposes to subsequent upstream bene-
16 ficial depletionary uses. A subordinated water right for power use does not 
17 glve rise to any claim against, or right to interfere with, the holder of 
18 subsequent upstream rights established pursuant to state law. The director 
19 shall also have the authority to limit a permit or license for power purposes 
20 to a specific term. 
21 Subsection (6) of this section shall not apply to licenses which have 
22 already been issued as of the effective date of this act. 
23 (7) The director in the exercise of the authority to limit a permit or 
24 license for power purposes to a specific term of years shall designate the 
25 number of years through which the term of the license shall extend and for 
26 purposes of determining such date shall consider amoJil!g~;,o,the:Z'''''Eactors: 
27 (a) The term of any power purchase contract which is, or reasonably may 
28 become, applicable to, such permit or license; 
29 (b) The policy of the Idaho public utilities commission (IPUC) regarding 
30 the term of power purchase contracts as administered by the IPUC under and 
31 pursuant to the authority of the public utility regulatory policy act of 
32 1978 (PURPA)j 
33 (c) The term of any federal energy regulatory commission (FERC) license 
34 granted, or which reasonably may be granted, with respect to any partic-
35 ular permit or license for power purpose; 
36 (d) Existing downstream water uses established pursuant to state law. 
37 The term of years shall be determined at the time of issuance of the permit, 
38 or as soon thereafter as practicable if adequate information 1S not then 
39 available. The term of years shall commence upon application of water to bene-
40 ficial use. The term of years, once established, shall not thereafter be modi-






RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT CCMMITrEE 
r·1ARCH 6, 1985 Rm 433, 1: 30 P.M. 
PRESENT: Chairman Noh, Senators Beitelspacher, Budge, Chapnan, Horsch, 
Kiebert, Little, Peavey, Ringert and SVerdsten. Senator Carlson 
was absent. Senator Crap:! was excused. 
HCR 18 
M<YI'ION 
'Ihe meeting was called to order by Chairman Noh. 
Senator Budge moved and Senator Beitelspacher seconded the 
minutes of the previous meeting be accepted as written. Motion 
carried. 
LAND EXCHANGE: HEARING, NOTIFICATION 
Representative Stoicheff explained the legislation would require 
three actions be taken before the Land Board exchanged state land for 
public land: (1) a public hearing is to be held on the proposed 
exchange, (2) each member of the House Resources and Conservation 
Committee and Senate Resources and Environment Committee will be 
advised of the proposed exchange and (3) notice shall be published 
in the paper. 
Senator Little moved and Senator Budge seconded this bill go out 









RELATING TO WATER RIGHI'S FOR HYDROPOWER PURPOSES 
The purpose of this bill is to provide direction to the 
Director of Water Resources in the exercise of his authority 
to issue term permits for water rights for hydropower purposes. 
The legislation should facilitate financing for small hydro-
projects by assuring adesuate review of any conditions attached 
by the Director. 
Mr. Kole r Attorney C~8ral's office, said they had no Objection 
to the amendment and neither did Idaho Power or the Governor IS 
office. 
Senator Budge said he had the same objections to the bill as he 
had before as felt it was not drafted properly with any changes 
underlined as required by the rules of the SE¥1ate. 
Said that Legislative Council had approved this method of doing 
the amendment. He assured the canmittee that the only changes 
were the ones he outlined in his analysis of the bill. (Attached). 
The purpose of the bill is to give small hydro producers the same 
protection that Idaho Power has. 
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Senator Ringert said he shared some of Senator Budge's concern. 
He noted that it seems there would be two section of 42-203B 
since the one section that has passed has not been repealed. 
Mr. Runft explained that they had conferred wi th Legislative 
Council and had proceeded on that advice and did not bring 
it back to the Senate Committee as time for introduction had 
run out. He said they had merely proceeded as they had been 
advised. 
Senator Ringert said he felt this was an important piece of 
legislation to the people involved and if they were wllling 
to proceed with it as written, perhaps it should be moved on. 
Senator Budge felt SB 1008 would be in jeopardy and not this bill. 
Discussion continued on the way the bill was drafted. 
Mr. Holland, Idaho Water Users, said they supported this legislation 
and felt like it was compatible with SB 1008. 
Mr. Ravenscroft said he shared Senator Budge's concern but was 
told by Legislative Council this was the way to handle the bill 
and that the Codifying Cc:mnission would take care of things, so 
he accepted it. The small power people face a problem of getting 
finances. They feel a permit for water rights should have some 
criteria on which the length of time is based. All the parties 
concerned agreed this was a desirable addition to SB 1008 and a 
practical measure. 
Again there was more discussion on the method used to draft the bill. 
Senator Ringert suggested one way to clear up this would be to 
ask Legislative Council to strike and underline a copy of this 
bill and give to the Senate when it is up for discussion. 
Senator Ringert moved and Senator Horsch seconded the bill go 
out with a "do pass" recanmendation. Motion carried. Senators 
Budge and Kiebert voted no. 
RELATING TO A FREE FISHING DAY 
Ken Norrie, Fish and Game, explained the purpose of the legislatLQl1 
is to provide that no fishing license be required for any person 
to fish on a free fishing day as designated by the Fish and Game 
Commission. The Department sees a chance here to create some 
JIM JONES 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEV GENERAL 
BOISE 83720 
February 15, 1985 
The Honorable J. Vard Chatburn 
Representative, District 24 
Statehouse Mail 
Re: "House Bill No. 186 
Dear Chairman Chatburn: 
TELEPHONE 
12081334"2400 
En6losed herewith please find an analysis of House Bill No. 
186. Pat Costello and I have prepared the analysis in a 
separate document as some members of the committee have 
expressed a desire to have the document incorporated into a 
statement of legislative intent. As you know, the Senate in 
passage of S.B. 1008 took this approach, therefore, it may be 
desirable for your committee to do likewise. The Attorney 
General's Office, as one of the negotiators to the Swan Falls 
Agreement, supports House Bill No. 186. It is our 
understanding that the Governor's office also supports House 
Bill No. 186 and that the Idaho Power Company has no objection 
to it. 
If ther e is anyth ing fur ther tha t we can pr ov ide, please 
advise. 
PJK: ams 
Enclos ur es 
very truly yours, 
C;;2-t:i y;t /L 
Patrick J. Kole 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Legislative and 
Public Affairs Division 
ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 186 
House Bill 186 amends Senate Bill 1008 in two respects. On 
page 1, paragraph 3, line 40, the word "consumptive" is added 
between "future" and "upstream." The purpose of this amendment 
is to make it clear that water rights for power purposes are 
subject to subordination to and depletion by future consumptive 
ups tr earn benef ic ial us ers. Th is was the in ten t of the or ig inal 
" - . --
legislation and is added -for clarification purposes. 
The second change made to S. B. 100 8 by H. B. 186 is the 
addition of paragraph 7 on page 2, line 23. The purpose of 
this change is to provide guidance to the director of the 
Department of water Resources when he sets a specific term of 
years for a wa ter perm i t or 1 icense for power pur poses. The 
proposed amendment sets forth specific criteria which the 
director must consider in setting that term. The purpose 0 f 
these amendments is to make sure the director does not 
inadvertently set too short a per iod of time in the permi t or 
license, thus preventing the financing of small hydropower 
projects. 
Th is does not el iminate, nor does th is amendmen t speak to, 
the subordination condition contained within the permit. Thus, 
th e wa ter r igh t iss ue for hydr opo\.;er purposes wou Id s ti 11 be 
1-
.. J . 
s ubordina te to s ubsequen t ups tr ea m benef ic ial uses appr oved in 
accordance with state law. In effect, this amendment would 
afford, if the director appropriately found, the same 
protection to small hydropower producer as will exist for Idaho 
Power at its hydroelectric facilities should the entire Swan 
Falls Agreement become law. It is not the intent of this 
legislation to unsubordinate small hydropower water rights. 
The amendment also provides that small hydropower producers 
will be afforded due process of law prior to their subordinated 






STATEMENT BY JOHN L. RUNFT BEFORE THE 
THE IDAHO HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION 
Vard Chatburn, Chairman 
February 15, 1985 
1:30 p.m., House Minority Caucus Room 
Subject: Testimony regarding House 8ill 186 
Regarding Proposed Supplemental Language 
to Senate Bill 1008 by adding a new sub-
section (7) to Section 42-2038 of Senate 
Bill 1008 
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for the 
record, my name is John L. Runft and I am an attorney practicing 
in Boise, Idaho. I appear before this committee representing 
Salmon River Hydro Company, Inc., an Idaho corporation, and 
Renewable Resources Development Company, a general partnership. 
80th of these organizations are composed of developers of small 
hydro-electric facilities under the Public Utility Regulatory 
Practices Act (PURPA). My clients are together presently devel-
oping 27 small hydro-power projects, all of which are located on 
the reaches of the Little and Main Salmon Rivers, and all of 
which would be directly and materially impacted by the legisla-
tion proposed in Senate Bill 100S. These developers have 
expended substantial money and time in an effort to develop 
their respective hydro-electric projects as envisioned under 
PURPA. All 27 projects have been granted preliminary permits or 
exemptions, or have licenses pending under the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). Applications for water permits 
have either been accepted or have been granted on all of the 
projects by the Idaho Department of Water Resources. In sum-
mary, these are serious projects in which considerable engineer-
inq and development work has been done and in which citizens of 
Idaho have expended substantial sums of money and time. 
In previous testimony before this committee, I have 
had the privilege of advising the committee that we have been 
able to work out a satisfactory compromise regarding the con-
cerns the small hydro-power developers have had with Senate Bill 
100S. This compromise has been worked out among my clients, 
other small hydro-power developers, the Idaho State Department 
of Water Resources, the Governor's office, and Idaho Power Com-
pany. This compromise is incorporated in and forms the essence 
of House Bill lS6 which is before you now. 
TESTIMONY (February 15, 1985) - 1 
H 
Let me state at the outset that my clients, as well as 
the other small hydro developers with whom we have had contact, 
support the sensible, needed compromise envisioned in Senate 
Bill 1008 and its attendant bills. Our purpose in urging 
passage of House Bill 186 is to accommodate the concerns of the 
small hydro developers without negatively impacting the purposes 
of and effectiveness of Senate Bill 1008. It is my under-
standing that Idaho Power Company has no objection to House Bill 
186 and that the State of Idaho affirmatively supports this 
bill. House Bill 186 in effect amends Senate Bill 1008 by 
adding new lanquage to Section 42-203B of Senate Bill 1008. The 
additions to Section 42-203B are addition of the word 
"consumptive" in the last sentence of subsection 3 and the 
addition of a new subsection 7. 
The ad d it ion of the word "comsumpt i ve" in the las t 
sentence of 42-203B(3) merely serves to clarify and emphasize 
that any future depletion of the subordinated water rights held 
in trust is limited to consumptive upstream beneficial use by 
the holders of rights acquired pursuant to state law. This 
emphasis and limitation to consumptive use is in harmony with 
the purpose and meaning of Senate~Blll 1008. 
The proposed subsection (7) of section 42-203B 
contains the language meeting the principal concerns of the 
small hydro-power developers, and to a considerable extent this 
language serves to limit and modify the provisions of the 
preceding subsection (6) of Section 42-203B of Senate Bill 1008. 
My clients were concerned that the language in subsection (6) 
qranting the director "the authority to limit a permit or 
license for power purposes to a specific term" is too broad. 
Even though the 1928 amendment to the Idaho Constitution vested 
in the state the power to regulate and limit the use of water 
for power purposes, water rights, once granted, still constitute 
property rights. Even though water rights for power purposes 
are subject to regulation and limitation by the state, such 
requlation and limitation must be made part of the right at the 
time it is qranted or otherwise the exercise of such authority 
by the director could face the constitutional objection of 
taking property without due process of law. 
The issue of suhordination of water rights granted for 
power purposes is not being raised here. Subordination of these 
rights is viewed by all parties as a necessary element in the 
underlying agreements reached in forging Senate Bill 1008. 
At issue here are the means and procedures through 
which the director's authority granted in subsection (6) will be 
exercised. Subsection (7) sets forth four factors, which among 
other factors the director must consider. These factors perform 
a mandatory guideline for the procedure by which the director 
will determine the term of years to be granted for a specific 
license. In shorthand, these factors require consideration of 
matters relating to: 
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term of any relevant power 
(b) Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) policy 
regarding the term of power purchase contracts in conjuction 
with the IPUC's ajudicatory administration of federal law 
(PURPA, FERC); 
(c) The term of years in any relevant FERC license; 
(d) Existing, legal downstream water uses. 
The final three sentences of subsection (7) modify the 
foregoing language of subsection (7). These sentences provide 
that the determination of the term of years shall be made at the 
time of the issueance of the permit, or as soon thereafter as 
possible. They provide. that the term of years shall commence 
upon the application of water to beneficial use. They provide 
that the term of years, once established, shall not thereafter 
be modified, except in accordance with due process of law. 
Subsection (7) solves an important procedural problem 
arising out of the diacotomy pres~nted by the granting of 
permits on one hand and licenses on the other. In exercising 
his authority to limit such a permit or license to a specific 
term of years, the term of years so designated shall apply only 
to the license, even though the designation may be first stated 
in the permit. Hence, if a permit is "proved up" and the water 
put to beneficial use within the permit period, then the term of 
years granted by the director will commence to run for purposes 
of the license. The license when granted will refer back to the 
date of application to beneficial use as the time of the 
commencement of the license term. 
Finally, the last sentence of subsection (7) provides 
economic protection to the small hydro project developer. A 
developer's investment in a hydro-electric project can be very 
substantial and is generally totally commited and spent by the 
time the water is actually put to beneficial use. Any 
subsequent curtailment of the term of years in the water right 
is made subject to due process of law, which would require a 
court's consideration of economic loss faced by a developer of a 
project by any such time curtailment of his water right 
occurring under the subordination doctrine. These losses could 
be considerable is such curtailment results in the project 
owners breach of the power purchase contract with the utility to 
which he has agreed to supply power. Virtually all of these 
power purchase agreements have severe economic penalties for 
failure on the part of the small hydro producer to continue 
power production for the term of power purchase contract. 
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Finally, these guidelines and due process provisions 
of subsection (7) will serve to create a sound, reasonable basis 
for considerations to be made by FERC in granting licenses to 
Idaho developers of small hydro and for the IPUC in exercising 
its policies under federal law relevant to these matters. 
We respectfully urge the passage by the committee of 
House Bill 186. 
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ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 186 
House Bill 186 amends Senate Bill 1008 in two respects. On 
page 1, paragraph 3, line 40, the word "consumptive" is added 
between "future" and "upstream." The purpose of this amendment 
is to make it clear that water rights for power purposes are 
subject to subordination to and depletion by future consumptive 
upstream beneficial users. This was the intent of the original 
legislation and is added for clarification purposes. 
The second change made to S. B. 1008 by H. B. 186 is the 
addition of paragraph 7 on page 2, line 23-. The purpose of 
this change is to provide guidance to the director of the 
Department of water Resources when he sets a specific term of 
years for a water permit or license for power purposes. The 
proposed amendment sets fortfi specific criteria which the 
director must consider in setting that term. The pur pose 0 f 
these amendments is to make sure the director does not 
inadvertently set too short a period of time in the permit or 
license, thus preventing the financing of small hydropower 
projects. 
This does not eliminate, nor does this amendment speak to, 
the subordination condition contained within the permit. Thus, 
the water right issue for hydropower purposes would still be 
subordinate to subsequent upstream beneficial uses approved in 
accordance with state law. In effect, this amendment would 
a f ford, if the d ir ector appropr ia tely found, the same 
protection to small hydropower producer as will exist for Idaho 
Power at, its hydroelec tr ic fac il i ties shou Id the en t ir e Swan 
Falls Agreement become law. 
legislation to unsubordinate 
The amendment also provides 
It is not the intent of this 
small hydropower water rights. 
that small hydropower producers 
will be afforded due process of law prior to their subordinated 
water right being reallocated to other uses . 
. ', 
- 2-

